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Foreword
I am pleased to contribute a Foreword to this report. The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) has cited fraud as one of the ten leading causes 
of inefficiency in health systems, and it is good that this report provides 
detailed information about its extent. In particular, the volume of the 
health expenditure where losses have been measured, and the variety 
of types of expenditure covered, make the report’s conclusions – that an 
average of more than 6% of expenditure is lost - convincing.  
Fraud is an important problem for health systems around the world. The 
authors of the report are to be congratulated for their research – over 17 
years – into this issue. WHO has previously recognised the importance 
of countries improving the efficiency of their health systems, thereby 
releasing resources that could be used to cover more people, with more 
services of high quality. In short, fraud constrains progress towards 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC).
However, having credible information about the problem of losses to 
health systems is not a goal in itself. The most important reason to 
know about the problem is to be better able to apply the right solutions 
- informing the prioritisation of work to counter fraud, the level of 
investment to be made and where best to focus action. 
The data revealed by the report shows that one off, large scale frauds 
are unusual, but widespread low value fraud is common. This makes 
it harder to detect more than a small proportion and means that an 
emphasis needs to be placed on pre-empting fraud, rather than reacting 
to it after it has occurred. Fraud which is visible and which has been 
detected is only a small element of the total cost.
Fraud in the health system has a direct negative impact on human life – 
patient care is diminished in the quality and quantity which can be made 
available. It also prevents appropriate forms of health promotion and 
prevention that allows people to take control of their own health. 
The report highlights examples where real gains have been made by 
reducing the cost of fraud – with up to a 40% reduction possible within 
12 months. This is obviously good news and with health systems under 
financial pressure, cutting the cost of fraud can be a significant additional 
source of progress towards UHC, for example by putting the “recovered” 
resources towards increased coverage of services for health promotion, 
disease prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and/or palliative care.
It is important that those leading health systems – wherever they are in 
the world – read this report. They need to make sure that their systems 
are properly protected against fraud rather than simply responding after 
it does occur and losses have been incurred. As with the protection of 
health more generally, proactive, pre-emptive action has an important 
role to play.
JOSEPH KUTZIN 
Coordinator, Health Financing Policy at the World Health Organisation.
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Preface
“I was very pleased to be asked to contribute an updated preface to this 
renewed version of the ‘Financial Cost of Healthcare Fraud’ report.
I have spent a significant part of my career looking at this particular 
problem. For many years it was a problem which most people were 
unwilling to discuss or acknowledge. The public perception has always 
been that healthcare workers are dedicated individuals whose only 
concern is patients’ welfare and that is, to a large extent, true. But hiding 
among them is a small number who are involved in healthcare for entirely 
the wrong reasons and, for them, the trust that society invests in them 
and the confidentiality which rightly preserves patients’ privacy, also 
provides a convenient smokescreen behind which to hide criminal activity.
Patients, of course, can also be responsible for fraud, although it is with 
the providers and those working in the industry where the opportunity is 
greatest.
I have studied the subject of healthcare fraud wastage and abuse for 
something approaching two decades now and have seen huge changes. 
Most people – or at least those I meet - now acknowledge that, just as in 
every other area of human enterprise, there are those who could commit 
fraud. What still surprises me is that, outside of the USA (which has both 
a serious problem and some very well established and effective solutions), 
there is so little published about the cost and nature of that fraud. 
About 15 years ago, I was one of the founders of the Health Insurance 
Counter Fraud Group - an initiative to tackle fraud and abuse in the 
private healthcare market. Since then I have often been asked to give 
advice or assistance by various organisations in setting up anti-fraud 
programmes. I have always been happy to give such advice and 
assistance as I can. Many of the people who ask me are considering 
investing in expensive software or high tech solutions. These things work 
well and have an important place but the most important thing is to start 
with the basics. The first piece of advice I always give, which is echoed 
in this report, is that, in order to develop a solution, it is first necessary to 
quantify and understand the nature of the problem. Once the problem is 
understood, only then is it possible to develop a framework of policies, 
procedures, controls and solutions needed to minimise and design out 
the risk. 
Quantification has another important role too – in this day and age we 
all have to justify our existence and, in the 21st century, it is very difficult, 
if not impossible, to persuade organisations to invest in solutions to 
a problem, the size and scope of which is unknown. It also makes it 
extremely difficult to judge whether a solution is working or not, unless 
the problem is understood.
I would like to end by suggesting that if there are any readers who still 
have doubts, they should read the website for the US Government Office 
of the Inspector General http://oig.hhs.gov/. It has a whole area devoted 
to healthcare fraud and makes for some sobering reading and it speaks 
for itself.
DR SIMON PECK 
Dr Simon Peck is a founder and former chair of the Health Insurance 
Counter Fraud Group. He works in the health insurance industry. 
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1.1. This Report renews research first undertaken in 2009 and 
repeated in 2011 and 2013, collating the latest, accurate, 
statistically valid information from around the world about 
the real financial cost of healthcare fraud (and error).
1.2 The measurement of losses to fraud (and error) is an 
essential first step to successful action. Once the extent 
of fraud losses is known then they can be treated like 
any other business cost – something to be reduced and 
minimised in the best interest of the financial health and 
stability of the organisation concerned. It becomes possible 
to go beyond reacting to unforeseen individual instances of 
fraud and to develop business strategies to pre-empt and 
minimise fraud losses.
1.3 The Report doesn’t just look at detected fraud or the 
individual cases which have come to light and been 
prosecuted. Because there is no crime which has a 100% 
detection rate, adding together detected fraud significantly 
underestimates the problem. It also raises the question as 
to whether, if detected fraud losses go up, does that  
mean that there has been more fraud or just a higher level 
of detection? Equally, if detected fraud losses fall, does  
that mean that there has been less fraud or a lower level  
of detection?
1.4 The Report also doesn’t rely on survey-based information 
where those involved are asked for their opinions about the 
level of fraud. These tend to vary significantly according to 
the perceived seriousness of the problem at the time by 
those surveyed. While they sometimes represent a valid 
survey of opinion, that is very different from a valid survey 
of losses.
1.5 The financial and economic damage resulting from 
healthcare fraud (and error) is surely the worst aspect of 
the problem. Yes, fraud is unethical, immoral and unlawful; 
yes, the individuals who are proven to have been involved 
should be punished; yes, the sums lost to fraud need to be 
traced and recovered. However, these are actions which 
take place after the fraud losses have happened, after 
the resources have been diverted from where they were 
intended and after the damage to the quality of patient care 
has occurred.
1.6 In almost every other area, healthcare organisations know 
what their costs are – staffing costs, accommodation 
costs, utility costs, procurement costs and many others. 
For centuries, these costs have been assessed and 
reviewed and measures have been developed to pre-empt 
them and improve efficiency. This incremental process now 
often delivers quite small additional improvements.
1.7 Fraud (and error) costs, on the other hand, have only very 
rarely had the same focus. The common position has been 
that organisations have either denied that they had any 
fraud or planned only to react after fraud has taken place. 
Because of this, fraud is now one of the great unreduced 
healthcare costs.
1.8 However, a cost can only be reduced if it can be measured, 
and a methodology to do this accurately has only been 
developed and implemented over the last decade.
1.9 Now that we can measure fraud (and error) losses, we can 
make proper judgements about the level of investment 
to be made in reducing them. We can also measure the 
financial benefits resulting from their reduction.
1.10 In the current macro-economic climate, reducing these 
losses is one of the least painful ways of reducing costs. 
Using global research, this Report identifies what the 
financial cost of healthcare fraud (and error) has been found 
to be and thus, the ‘size of the prize’ to be achieved from 
reducing it.
1.11 Of course, there is always more research to be done and 
any organisation should consider what its own fraud (and 
error) costs are likely to be, however, the volume of data 
which is already available from exercises now covering 
more than £2.9 trillion of healthcare expenditure, points 
clearly to losses usually being found in the range of 3-8%.
1.12 We will continue to monitor data as it becomes available 
and publish further reports as appropriate.  
1 // 
Introduction
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2.1 Building on previous research, this 2015 Report takes 
account of loss measurement data from 1997 to 2013 
and reports on a total of 107 exercises. The research 
published in this Report now covers 14 different types of 
healthcare expenditure totalling over £2.91 trillion ($4.44 
trillion), in 33 organisations from 7 countries. The value 
of the expenditure examined has not been uprated to 
2015 values. The losses referred to are expressed as a 
percentage loss of expenditure.
2.2 The Report is based on extensive global research, 
building on previously established direct knowledge, to 
collate information about relevant exercises. The data has 
then been analysed electronically. Exercises have been 
collated from Europe, North America and Australia and 
New Zealand. No data was available from Asia or Africa, 
although the authors are aware of developments which 
should lead to data being available in the near future.
2.3 The Report has excluded guesstimates, figures derived 
from detected fraud losses, and figures resulting from 
surveys of opinion. It has also excluded some loss 
measurement exercises where it is clear that they have  
not met the standards described below.
2.4 It has included exercises which have:
•  considered a statistically valid sample of income or 
expenditure;
•  sought and examined information indicating the  
presence of fraud, error or correctness in each case 
 within that sample;
•  been completed and reported;
•  been externally validated;
•  a measurable level of statistical confidence; and
•  a measurable level of accuracy.
2.5 There are a number of caveats:
•  Some of the exercises have resulted either in estimates 
of the fraud frequency rate, or the percentage of 
expenditure lost to fraud, and some have measured 
both;
•  It is also the case that some exercises have separately 
identified measured fraud (and error) and some have not;
•  Sometimes, once such exercises have been completed, 
the organisations concerned have, mistakenly in the 
view of the Report’s authors, decided not to publish their 
results. Transparency about the scale of the problem 
is a key factor in its solution, because attention can 
be focussed and a proportionate investment made to 
reduce the level of loss;
•  In some cases, those directly involved in countering fraud 
have decided, confidentially, to provide information about 
unpublished exercises for wider consideration. In those 
cases, while the overall figures have been included in the 
findings of this Report, no specific reference has been 
made to the organisations concerned;
•  The authors of this Report are also aware of a very small 
number of other exercises which have been completed, 
but which have not been published and where nothing is 
known of the findings;
and
•  Finally, it is important to emphasise that this research will 
never be complete. More evidence becomes available 
each year. However, much of the evidence does point 
clearly in one direction, as is explained later.
2.6 While it is necessary to make these caveats clear, the 
importance of the evidence collated in this Report should 
not be underestimated. It shows that losses to fraud (and 
error) in the healthcare sector represent a significant, 
damaging and, crucially, unnecessary business cost.
2 // 
Overview
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3.1 The seven countries in which the authors are aware that 
healthcare loss analysis exercises have taken place are:
•  the UK;
•  the United States;
•  France;
•  Belgium;
•  The Netherlands;
•  Australia; and
•  New Zealand.
3.2 By value of income or expenditure measured, the United 
States has undertaken the greatest amount of work in this 
area. This is a direct reflection of the Improper Payments 
Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) (followed by the more recent 
Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010) 
which requires designated major U.S. public authorities 
to estimate the annual amount of payments made where 
fraud (and error) are present, and to report the estimates 
to the President and Congress with a progress report on 
actions to reduce them.
3.3 The guidance relating to the IPIA stated “The estimates 
shall be based on the equivalent of a statistical random 
sample with a precision requiring a sample of sufficient size 
to yield an estimate with a 90% confidence interval of plus 
or minus 2.5%”. Many U.S. agencies undertake work to 
the higher standard often found in the U.K. and Europe – 
95% statistical confidence and + or - 1%.
3.4 In other countries, while there has not hitherto been any 
legal requirement, there is a growing understanding that 
the key to successful loss reduction is to understand the 
nature and scale of the problem. In Europe, as long ago 
as 2004, the European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption 
Declaration, agreed by organisations from 28 countries, 
called for “The development of a European common 
standard of risk measurement, with annual statistically valid 
follow up exercises to measure progress in reducing losses 
to fraud and corruption throughout the EU.”
3.5 The range of types of income and expenditure, where 
losses have been measured, include fraud (and error) 
involving patients, healthcare professionals, staff and 
managers, and contractors.
3.6 The specific areas where losses have been measured 
include:
•  the fraudulent provision of sickness certificates;
•  prescription fraud by pharmacists;
•  prescription fraud by patients;
•  fraud (and error) concerning capitation payments to 
general practitioners;
•  fraud (and error) concerning payments made to doctors 
to manage a patient’s medical care;
•  the evasion of dental charges by patients;
•  fraud (and error) by opticians concerning the provision of 
sight tests;
•  fraud (and error) concerning employees of healthcare 
organisations;
•  fraud (and error) concerning payments for in-patient 
hospital services;
•  fraud (and error) concerning long term care;
•  fraud (and error) concerning home and community based 
services;
•  fraud (and error) concerning the provision of services  
and supplies;
•  fraud (and error) concerning health insurance for children;
•  fraud (and error) concerning foster care; and
•  fraud (and error) concerning child care.
3 // 
The nature of the data  
which has been analysed
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4 // 
Healthcare fraud (and error) losses
4.1 The range of percentage losses across all the exercises 
reviewed between 1997 and 2013 was found to be between 
0.6% and 15.4% with average losses of 6.19%.
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4.2 Over 88% of the loss measurement exercises showed losses 
figures of more than 3%. 
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57.69%
Percentage loss <3%
Percentage loss 3-8%
Percentage loss >8%
4.3 Average losses have increased by 10.7% since 2007.
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4.4 It is clear that fraud remains a significant problem and 
one which involves a larger cost than previously thought. 
Where organisations have undertaken repeated exercises 
to measure their losses in the same areas of expenditure, 
then the evidence also shows that this has helped to 
reduce them.
4.5 The current global average loss rate of 6.19% - a running 
average taking account of 17 years of data - when 
expressed as a proportion of global healthcare expenditure 
for 2013 ($7.35 trillion, £4.83 trillion or €5.65 trillion), 
equates to £299 billion ($455 billion or €350 billion).
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4.6 This sum equates to:
•  more than three times the NHS’s total budget of  
£109.7 billion1 for 2013-2014;
•  more than twice the total healthcare expenditure of 
Canada for 2013; and
•  almost fifteen times the total healthcare expenditure of 
South Africa for 2011.
4.7 It represents around a sixth of the United States total 
healthcare expenditure for 2013 and more than a quarter of 
European Union countries total healthcare expenditure for 
the same period.
4.8 This is an enormous sum which is diverted from the 
provision of patient care.
4.9 If healthcare organisations reduced these losses by 40% - 
which individual organisations have achieved - it would free 
up more than £120 billion ($182 billion or €140 billion).
4.10 On the basis of the evidence, it is clear that fraud (and 
error) losses in any organisation should currently be 
expected to be at least 3%, probably more than 5% and 
possibly more than 10%. It would be wrong to go too 
much further in terms of predicting where in this range 
losses for an individual organisation will be, without some 
organisation-specific information about the strength 
of arrangements to protect it against fraud (its ‘fraud 
resilience’).
4.11 PKF Littlejohn and the CCFS, in parallel research, have 
developed Europe’s most comprehensive database of 
fraud resilience information, with data recorded concerning 
over 1100 organisations. By combining the data which 
underpins this report and organisation-specific information 
about fraud resilience, we are able, for the first time, to 
•  predict the likely scale of losses;
•  the key improvements which would reduce them; and
•  the related cost.
4.12 We can also accurately measure losses or train client 
organisations to do this. The practical experience of PKF 
Littlejohn specialists, combined with the academic rigour 
of CCFS researchers, provides an unparalleled expert 
resource.
1 The NHS Confederation
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5 // 
What this means for the NHS
5.1 It should be emphasised that this report is the product of 
global research to produce a global average percentage 
figure for losses in healthcare. Whilst the data reviewed 
includes outcomes from NHS loss measurement exercises, 
it is much broader than that. An important question is what 
do the global trends and averages tell us about likely levels 
of loss in the NHS?
5.2 The NHS used to have a programme of measuring the cost 
of fraud (and error). Between 1998 and 2006 fifteen loss 
measurement exercises took place. A further six exercises 
took place in 2007 – 2008. Only two exercises took place 
between 2009 and 2014.
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5.3 There are two key questions: 
•  What did these NHS-specific exercises show the cost of 
fraud (and error) in the NHS to be?
 and
•  Is there any evidence that losses in the NHS are likely to 
be any different from those found globally?
What did these NHS-specific exercises show the cost 
of fraud (and error) in the NHS to be?
5.4 Below it is possible to see the number of NHS loss 
measurement exercises and what they found.
NHS loss measurement exercises Range
1998 - 2001: Ten loss measurement 
exercises
5.1% - 6.72%
2002 - 2006: Five loss measurement 
exercises
1.6% - 3.9%
2007 - 2008: Six loss measurement 
exercises undertaken
2.0% - 9.3%
2009 - 2014: Two loss measurement 
exercises undertaken
2.94% - 3.49%
Is there any evidence that fraud losses in the NHS are 
likely to be any different from those found globally?
5.5 As discussed above, the current, running healthcare 
global average loss rate (for fraud (and error)) is 6.19%. 
Where healthcare loss measurement data is available to 
distinguish between fraud (and error), the split averages 
73.8% fraud / 26.2% error. Thus it would be expected that 
the healthcare global average fraud loss rate would be 
6.19% x 73.8% = 4.57% (‘the healthcare global average 
fraud loss rate’).
5.6 If we compare the results from the NHS exercises with 
the global running average, it can be seen that the latter is 
directly comparable with what has been found in the NHS.
1998 - 
2002
2002 - 
2006
2007 - 
2008
2009 - 
2014
NHS loss rate 
(highest) 6.72% 3.90% 9.30% 3.49%
NHS loss lowest 
(lowest) 5.10% 1.60% 2.00% 2.94%
Global healthcare 
average fraud  
loss rate
4.57% 4.57% 4.57% 4.57%
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5.7 A line graph shows this point even more clearly.
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5.8 What does this mean for the NHS? Rather than simply 
looking at a global figure – the global average fraud loss 
rate applied to NHS expenditure (£109.7 billion was spent 
on the NHS in England in 2013/142) would mean that 
£5.01 billion was lost annually – let us look at what the 
component elements of these losses would look like.
5.9 As with all fraud, the greatest losses are usually to be found 
where there is the greatest expenditure. The figures below 
are for 2013 – 2014:
•  Payroll expenditure £32.66 billion3 
•  Procurement expenditure  £20.6 billion4  
 (2011-2012) = £21.9 billion 
 (2013-2014 after inflation5)
•  General Practice £7.63 billion6
•  General Dental Services £3.01 billion7
• Pharmaceutical Services £2.1 billion8
• General Optical Services £0.523 billion9
5.10 This expenditure represents a total of £67.8 billion or 
61.8% of the total NHS expenditure for 2013-2014.
5.11 Fraud also affects the income which the NHS should 
receive in patient charges. These are prescription, dental 
and optical charges.
2 The NHS Confederation
3 The Health Foundation – January 2015
4 Better Procurement Better Value Better Care – Department of Health – August 2013
5 Bank of England inflation calculator applied
6 NHS Payments to General Practice – HSCIC – February 2015
7 NHS England Annual Report – 2013 - 2014
8 NHS England Annual Report – 2013 - 2014
9 NHS England Annual Report – 2013 - 2014
5.12 The next part of this Report examines each of these areas 
to outline what types of fraud can occur and what losses 
might be incurred in each area. All the figures quoted 
represent the annual loss to the NHS.
Payroll expenditure
5.13 NHS payroll expenditure has been reported to be 
£32.66 billion for 2013-2014. The NHS undertook a loss 
measurement exercise examining payroll expenditure in 
2003-2004 across the total payroll budget. Expenditure of 
this type at that time was £26.8 billion. The exercise found 
that the cost of fraud represented 1.7% of the expenditure 
but that the fraud prevalence rate was 3.4%. This indicates 
that most fraud of this type is high volume, low value.
5.14 While very few ghost employees were found, there were 
significant loss rates in the following areas:
•  incorrectly received allowances (3.2%);
•  incorrectly claimed employment histories (6.8%);     and
•  incorrectly claimed qualifications (6.8%).
5.15 Applying the 1.7% figure to 2013 payroll expenditure would 
equate to fraud losses of £555 million. If we apply the 
healthcare global average fraud loss rate (4.57%) then the 
figure would be £1.49 billion.
Procurement expenditure
5.16 NHS procurement expenditure has been reported to be 
£21.9 billion for 2013-2014. As there has never been a 
successful NHS loss measurement exercise looking at 
procurement expenditure, there is no NHS-specific loss 
percentage which can be applied. However, such exercises 
have been completed successfully in other sectors and 
have generally shown higher than usual loss rates in this 
area of expenditure. The lowest percentage fraud loss 
figure which has been found is 5.8%.
5.17 The nature of procurement fraud has mostly been found to 
be where goods or services are under-provided in terms of 
quality or quantity or over charged. Sometimes the goods 
or services are not provided at all. Where procurement 
fraud losses have been measured in other organisations,  
a key weakness has been found to be the lack of 
consistent data and communication between those 
procuring goods or services, those receiving or benefitting 
from them and those paying for them.
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5.18 Examples of procurement fraud range from that of two 
NHS managers, John Leigh and Deborah Hancox, who 
masterminded a 5-year procurement fraud worth £229,000 
against a health authority in the North West, and who 
were jailed for over five years in total, to the more common 
high volume, low value fraud which can easily become 
‘embedded’.
5.19 Applying the 5.8% percentage figure to 2013 procurement 
expenditure would equate to fraud losses of £1.27 billion. 
If we apply the healthcare global average fraud loss rate 
then the figure would be £1 billion.
General Practice 
5.20 According to the Health and Social Care Information 
Centre in 2015, £7.63 billion was paid to general practice 
service providers in 2013-2013. As there has never been 
a successful NHS loss measurement exercise looking at 
expenditure on general practice, there is no NHS-specific 
loss percentage which can be applied.
5.21 Examples of fraud include that of Dr Thirumurugan 
Sundaresan, a Rochdale doctor who stole over £62,000 
from the NHS by falsifying 1,700 patient records. Fraud 
also takes place in the following ways:
•  Creating ghost patients;
•  Claiming for services provided to ghost employees 
including production of false prescriptions;
•  Claiming for services not provided (enhanced services);
•  Raising false prescriptions for self-medicating; and
•  Accepting bribes to register overseas visitors.
5.22 The best estimate of the cost of fraud in this area therefore 
has to be based on the healthcare global average fraud 
loss rate. If we apply this figure then fraud losses would 
equate to £348 million.
General Dental Services
 5.23 According to the NHS England Annual Report for 2013-
2014, £3.01 billion was spent on General Dental Services 
(GDS). There have been six NHS loss measurement 
exercises considering the cost of fraud in GDS. The 
average loss rate is 4.03%.
5.24 Examples include that of Joyce Trail, the Birmingham 
dentist jailed for 7 years in 2012 for stealing £1.4 million 
from the NHS and dentists have also been found to claim 
for higher numbers of Units of Dental Activity than actually 
provided.
5.25 If we apply this 4.03% percentage to GDS expenditure, 
fraud losses would equate to £121 million. If we apply the 
healthcare global average fraud loss rate, then this figure 
would be £137 million.
Pharmaceutical Services 
5.26 According to the NHS England Annual Report for 2013-
2014, £2.1 billion was spent on Pharmaceutical Services 
(PhS). There have been six NHS loss measurement 
exercises considering the cost of fraud in PhS. The average 
loss rate is 3.97%.
5.27 Examples include a case where a pharmacist purported 
to dispense a much greater volume of drugs than was 
actually the case, thereby wrongfully obtaining over 
£200,000. Fraud also takes place where pharmacists claim 
for services not provided and fail to declare prescription 
charges which have been collected.
5.28 If we apply this 3.97% percentage to PhS expenditure, 
fraud losses would equate to £83 million. If we apply the 
healthcare global average fraud loss rate, then this figure 
would be £96 million.
General Optical Services 
5.29 According to the NHS England Annual Report for 2013-
2014, £0.523 billion was spent on General Optical Services 
(GOS). There have been nine NHS loss measurement 
exercises considering the cost of fraud in GOS. The 
average loss rate is 2.47%.
5.30 Examples include opticians claiming NHS allowances for 
individuals who are not entitled, creating ghost patients and 
claiming for the provision of phantom sight tests.
5.31 If we apply this 2.47% percentage to GOS expenditure, 
fraud losses would equate to £12.9 million. If we apply the 
healthcare global average fraud loss rate, then this figure 
would be £23.9 million.
Patient charges – prescription charge fraud
5.32 The NHS last undertook a loss measurement exercise 
concerning prescription charges in 2013-2014. The report 
concerning this exercise has not been published but was 
referred to in the media10 on 30 December 2014. The 
media article states ‘The Department of Health estimates 
29.4 million prescriptions were wrongly handed out for 
free last year at a cost of £237million.’ and then goes on 
to quote the health minister Dr Daniel Poulter. The figure of 
£237 million compares to a figure of £47 million in 2003.
10 The Daily Mail – 30 December 2014
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5.33 It is not known how the Daily Mail obtained this information 
but there is no record of it having been challenged by 
the Department of Health. It would therefore not be 
unreasonable to accept this figure of loss for 2013-2014.
Patient charges – dental charge fraud
5.34 The NHS has not undertaken a loss measurement exercise 
concerning dental charge fraud since 2007-2008. The 
report concerning this exercise reveals losses of £36.3 
million and a loss rate to fraud of 3.8%.
5.35 If we use the Bank of England inflation calculator these 
losses equate to £43.9 million in 2013-2014 (assuming that 
no other factors have caused this figure to rise or fall).
Patient charges – optical charge fraud
5.36 The NHS has not undertaken a loss measurement exercise 
concerning optical charge fraud since 2007-2008. The 
report concerning this exercise reveals losses of £18.9 
million and a loss rate to fraud of 3.0%.
5.37 If we use the Bank of England inflation calculator these 
losses equate to £22.9 million in 2013-2014 (assuming that 
no other factors have caused this figure to rise or fall).
NHS losses
5.38 If we take these figures together:
•  Payroll expenditure £555 million - £1.49 billion
• Procurement expenditure £1 billion - £1.27 billion
• General Practice £348 million
•  General Dental Services £121 million - £137 million
• Pharmaceutical Services £83 million - £96 million
• General Optical Services £12.9 million - £23.9 million
They represent losses in these areas of expenditure of 
between £2.12 billion - £3.36 billion.
5.39 The areas of expenditure which have been studied 
(above) represent 61.8% of NHS expenditure for 2013-
2014. If we extrapolate these figures across the totality of 
NHS expenditure then the losses would be between £3.43 
billion - £5.44 billion.
5.40 It is then necessary to add the figure for lost income from 
patient charges:
• Prescription charge fraud £237 million
• Dental charge fraud £43.9 million
• Optical charge fraud £22.9 million
These three areas of fraud represent total losses  
of £303.8 million.
5.41 If we add losses to expenditure and income then 
total losses to the NHS would be between  
£3.73 billion - £5.74 billion.
5.42 Several points arise from this analysis:
•  The NHS’s own loss measurement exercises (now sadly 
almost completely curtailed) do not show significantly 
different loss rates from those found globally in other 
healthcare organisations (and highlighted in previous 
reports of this type);
•  The level of loss is significant and is likely to undermine 
the NHS’s capacity to provide patient care of the quality 
which it wishes to;
•  These losses can be reduced substantially. This is 
not just shown globally but from the NHS’s own 
history between 1998 and 2006, where, losses were 
substantially reduced and fell significantly below the 
healthcare global average loss rate.
So what is to be done?
5.43 So what is to be done? It is the view of the authors of this 
Report that there are three first steps for the NHS to take 
to reduce the cost of fraud:
 1)  The NHS needs to re-adopt an approach which 
is focussed on reducing the cost of fraud not just 
investigating and prosecuting individual examples 
(although this is important too);
 2)  It therefore needs to re-commence loss measurement 
exercises across key expenditure streams. It is only with 
accurate knowledge about the nature and extent of 
fraud that proportionate, effective action can be taken to 
reduce its extent;
 3)  It needs to re-create a powerful, well-resourced 
organisation to lead this work with a remit and authority 
across all parts of the NHS.
10 The Daily Mail – 30 December 2014
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6.1 This Report renews research into accurate information 
concerning the extent of losses to healthcare fraud 
(and error). Without such information it is impossible for 
healthcare organisations to properly prioritise the problem 
or to invest proportionate sums in solving it.
6.2 The research demonstrates that it is possible to measure 
the nature and extent of healthcare losses – and to reduce 
them. It may be embarrassing for some organisations to 
find out just how much they are losing but it is possible to 
do this.
6.3 The report is based on global research and highlights a 
global healthcare average loss rate both for fraud (and 
error) and for fraud alone. However, it also focusses on the 
UK’s National Health Service and shows what the issues 
and problems are there, making some recommendations 
for improvements, including recommencing work to 
measure and reduce losses.
6.4 Because of the direct, negative impact on human life 
caused by healthcare losses, it is never easy to admit they 
take place. However, the first step to reducing losses is to 
stop being in denial about them. If an organisation is not 
aware of the extent or nature of its losses, how can it apply 
the right solution and reduce them?
6.5 Where losses have been measured, and the organisations 
concerned have accurate information about their nature 
and extent, there are many examples where losses have 
been substantially reduced. Indeed, these examples 
include historic success in the UK’s National Health Service 
(the second largest organisation in the world) between 
1999 and 2006, where losses were reduced by up to 60%, 
and by up to 40% over a shorter period.
6.6 Four things are clear:
•  losses to healthcare fraud (and error) can be measured – 
and cost effectively;
•  on the basis of the evidence it is likely that losses in any 
healthcare organisation and any area of expenditure, will 
be at least 3%, probably more than 5% and possibly over 
10%; 
•  with the benefit of accurate information about their 
nature and extent, they can be reduced significantly;
 and
•  countering fraud effectively could free up considerable 
resources for better patient care, whether in the UK or 
globally. 
6.7 The authors of this Report hope that it focuses attention 
on the problem of healthcare fraud (both in the UK and 
globally) and on the potential benefits to be derived from 
starting to solve it. 
6 // 
Conclusion
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